Consumer Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Preseizure Replevin Proceedings by Resnick, Alan N.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 5
Consumer Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial
Preseizure Replevin Proceedings
Alan N. Resnick
Copyright c 1974 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Alan N. Resnick, Consumer Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Preseizure Replevin Proceedings, 16
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 269 (1974), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss2/5
CONSUMER ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
JUDICIAL PRESEIZURE REPLEVIN PROCEEDINGS
ALAN N. RESNICK*
In 1972, when the Supreme Court held two state statutes allowing
prejudgment replevin of chattels without prior notice or an oppor-
tunity to be heard Violative of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution,' consumer advocates applauded the
expansion of due process principles. Fear that increased costs and
delay resulting from disruption of creditors' remedies might impair
the operation of the consumer credit market, however, led the Court
to call for legislative innovations designed to minimize these ef-
fects.2
Two years later, the expansion of due process protections for con-
sumer debtors subsided when, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,3 the
Court upheld a Louisiana sequestration procedure allowing prejudg-
*B.S., Rider College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., Harvard Law
School. Assistant Professor, Hofstra University School of Law.
1. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Fuentes allowed flexibility in conducting presei-
zure hearings and encouraged legislatures to develop procedures to minimize costs and delay,
hoping to prevent adverse economic reaction in the credit market which might result from
the Court's holding:
The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to
many potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation-not
adjudication. Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing
is to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, however, it is axio-
matic that the hearing must provide a real test.
Id. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).
In a footnote to this call for legislative action, Justice Stewart stated: "Leeway remains to
develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while pfeserving the
fairness and effectiveness of the hearing in preventing seizures of goods where the party
seeking the writ has little probability of succeeding on the merits of the dispute." rd. at 97
n.33.
Several commentators agreed with the suggestion that state legislatures shape new replevin
procedures. See, e.g., Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEXa TacK. L. Rav. 23, 42 (1972) ("However,
for the practicing attorney of today who needs to get a writ of replevin to protect his client,
all of these variations must await legislative action."); Patton, Creditors' Remedies: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 28 Bus. LAw. 753, 766 (1973) ("The Supreme Court in Fuentes made it
abundantly clear that prejudgment seizures will be upheld so long as conducted pursuant to
a properly drawn statutory scheme. The problem is out of the hands of the judiciary. The
enactment of statutes which will conform to the requirements of due process should not
present an insurmountable task.").
3. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
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ment seizure of chattels on a creditor's ex parte application.4 By
approving a prejudgment seizure remedy which required neither
notice nor prior adversary hearing, as long as other procedural safe-
guards were employed, the Court made the desirability of prior
notice and hearing as much a question of legislative discretion as
one of constitutional mandate;' now state lawmakers may decide
4. Id. at 1906. Justice White, speaking for the Court, did not overrule Fuentes, but distin-
guished it, pointing out that the statutes considered in Fuentes did not provide for "judicial
order, approval or participation," did not require the creditor to "make a convincing showing
before the seizure," and did not provide for an immediate hearing on the merits of the
conflicting debtor-creditor claims. Id. at 1904. Nevertheless, it is difficult to disagree with
Justice Powell's remark that, to the extent that it required an adversary hearing prior to
seizure, ". . . it [is] fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled." Id. at 1908 (concurring
opinion).
5. See notes 39-42 infra & accompanying text.
The extent to which legislatures now have discretion to choose a form of replevin which
does not incorporate prior notice and hearing is not yet clear. In Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F.
Supp. 1254, 1259 (S.D. Tex. 1974), a Texas sequestration statute was declared unconstitu-
tional because it "fail[ed] to comply with prior notice and hearing requirements of Fuentes,
and [did] not measure up ta the standards approved by the Supreme Court in Mitchell."
Unlike the Louisiana statute, the Texas procedure did not provide for allegation of specific
facts in a creditor's petition, did not require judicial scrutiny of the petition, and did not
provide for an immediate hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim. It would thus appear
that a procedure which did not comply strictly with the protective requirements set out in
Mitchell might have to meet the Fuentes test of adequate opportunity for notice and hearing
prior to deprivation of property except in extraordinary circumstances. Absent the stringently
restricted scope of the Louisiana statute, Fuentes prior notice and hearing may remain man-
datory. Compare Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974) (uphold-
ing North Dakota prejudgment seizure statute that provided the same protections as the
Mitchell statute), to Sugar v. Curtis Publishing Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(invalidating New York prejudgment attachment statute that provided all of the Mitchell
protections except for the right of an immediate postseizure hearing). See also North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
Other limitations may be imposed by state courts in interpreting their own constitutions.
For example, in Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d
. 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), the California Supreme Court struck down an attachment
procedure under section 537(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The section was
considered unconstitutional under both article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution and
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Language in
Randone suggests that, in order to comply with due process, a taking of essentials must be
based on "an impartial confirmation of the actual, as opposed to probable, validity of the
creditor's claim after a hearing on that issue." 5 Cal. 3d at_, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 726. Such a limitation would restrict the usefulness of implementing procedures which
determine only probable right to recovery since many goods, such as stoves, refrigerators,
cars, and television sets, which are frequently the subject of petitions for replevin or attach-
ment, may well be classified as necessities.
Another problem may arise in connection with state constitutional requirements when
legislatutes consider the feasibility of providing for an arbitration procedure in which repre-
sentation by counsel is to be discouraged or barred. In California, for example, due process
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whether these particular procedural safeguards are beneficial to
both consumer and creditor interests. While resolution of this prob-
lem may hinge upon subjective notions of fairness and justice, re-
sponsible legislative decisions also will require careful analysis of
the economic effects of providing prior notice and hearing to alleg-
edly defaulting consumer debtors.
Mandatory arbitration to test the creditor's claims prior to repos-
session can provide one procedure that will 'ensure fairness to the
consumer while minimizing burdens on creditors and the consumer
credit market. Providing an economical opportunity to be heard by
means of mandatory consumer credit arbitration can resolve the
present constitutional uncertainty by guaranteeing procedural due
process rights in prejudgment replevin proceedings.
PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES AND BALANCING INTERESTS
Current Remedies and Their Constitutional Limitations
Prejudgment Seizure of Chattels
The body of commercial law which developed over past centuries
in England and the United States rewards those creditors who most
quickly acquire some interest in their debtor's identifiable prop-
erty.6 Risks inherent in relying solely upon being the first to gain an
interest in the debtor's property by means of a money judgment
obtained after default have led creditors to utilize the secured trans-
action to "reserve" the right to a specific chattel if the debtor fails
to meet his financial obligations.7
If a debtor defaults on his obligation to a secured creditor, the
creditor may take possession of the property designated as collateral
has been interpreted to require a hearing with an opportunity to be represented by counsel
before a person may be deprived of property. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661,
504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973); Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668,
321 P.2d 9 (1958); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d
38 (Dist. Ct. 1946). A legislature operating under such a state mandate would be unable to
eliminate counsel, and the expense accompanying representation, from any proposed arbitra-
tion procedure which included even interim adjudication of the right to possession. See note
91 infra & accompanying text.
6. "The Anglo-Saxon system of debt collection has frequently been described as one of
'grab law' where the race is to the swift. He who grabs last may find himself with an empty
fist." Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 521 (1973).
7. See UNwonM CormRcmR, Co art. 9. For a discussion of the modem use of security
interests, see Goodwin, Repossession and Sale After Default: An Old Remedy Under Fire, 10
Am. Bus. L.J. 221 (1973).
19741
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:269
with a minimum of formality; if the collateral can be taken without
a "breach of the peace," the creditor may take possession without
employing judicial process.8 Since most consumer goods cannot be
taken without a breach of the peace, however, the use of self-help
is rare,9 the secured creditor often resorting instead to state replevin
procedures.' 0 Prejudgment replevin has been utilized because it is
relatively inexpensive and speedy. Prior to 1972, at least 47 states
and the District of Columbia had prejudgment replevin statutes,
most of which permitted the replevin of personalty prior to notice
and before the debtor had an opportunity to dispute the creditor's
claims in any type of judicial hearing."
In recent decades the use of consumer credit in the United States
has expanded dramatically, the level increasing from 21.5 billion
dollars in 1950 to more than 137.2 billion dollars in 1971.12 Most
8. UNIFORM COwmRCrAL CODE § 9-503. In contrast to the Supreme Court's recent pro-
nouncements 'on prejudgment replevin, resolution of the closely related self-help issue has
not been attempted. Several lower courts have held, however, that self-help repossession,
which does not involve state action, is not subject to federal due process restraints. Bichel
Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Southern
California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene
v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank.of.America, 342
F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See generally Goodwin, supra note 7; Krihmer, Clifford &
Lasley, supra note 2, at 47-50; Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 767 (1973);
White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Euen More, 1973 Wis. L. REV.
503; Comment, Constitutional Law: State Action: U. C. C. Self-Help Repossession Prouisions
(§§ 9-503, 9.504) Violate Due Process Requirements, 57 MINN. L. REv. 621 (1973); Comment,
Self-Help Repossessions Under UCC Section 9-503-"State Action"?, 44 U. COLO. L. Ray.
389 (1973).
9. See White, supra note 8. Professor White points out the rarity of self-help repossession
in consumer situations, except in cases involving automobiles:
In the first place, it appears that when one speaks of self-help repossession he
is talking mostly of automobiles and that virtually all repossession of automo-
biles is done by self-help. That is, creditors who choose to repossess washing
machines, refrigerators, and other household goods must usually resort to judi-
cial repossession in any event because the crossing of the threshold uninvited
will constitute a breach of the peace and is therefore not permitted by sectiofi
9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 513 (footnotes omitted).
10. UNIroFR COMMRCIAL CODE § 9-503. The writ of replevin originated at least seven
centuries ago as a device to protect feudal tenants from manor lords who took their tenants'
possessions illegally to satisfy alleged rent claims. For a discussion of the history of common
law replevin, see Countryman, supra note 6, at 545-46.
11. Krahmer, Clifford & Lsley, supra note 2, at 39. For a detailed list of these states with
further categorization and analysis of their replevin statutes, see id. at 39-41.
12. NAIONAL COMISSION ON CONSumER FINANcE, CONSUmER CREDrr IN ri UNID STATS
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purchases of major durables by low- and middle-income consumers
are made on credit, using either conditional sales contracts or con-
sumer loans; seventy-five percent of all low-income consumers use
credit for the purchase of at least one major durable product.13
Sharp acceleration in the use of consumer credit has increased de-
pendence on the secured transaction as a protective device for con-
sumer lenders and retail sellers. Reliance on security interests, in
turn, has enabled lenders and retailers to extend credit to consum-
ers who, but for their ability to convey a security interest, would be
unacceptable credit risks."
Recent consumer protection legislation has not altered materially
self-help or judicial procedures for repossessing collateral. The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, now effective in seven states, S subjects
consumer debtors to the Uniform Commercial Code repossession
procedures with only slight modifications.5 Curiously, the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, enacted by Congress in 1968, is silent
on secured transactions and methods of repossession,17 despite its
restrictions on wage garnishment. 8 An early draft of the National
Consumer Act prohibited self-help or nonjudicial repossession in
consumer situations, but the drafters subsequently retreated from
this absolute prohibition. 9 Pieservation of secured transaction and
5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATONAL ComanssION]. For a discussion of the history of
consumer credit in the United States, see id. at 5-21. See also R. NUGENT, CONSUMER CREDrr
AND ECONOMIC STABmrry (1939).
13. D. CAPLovrrz, Tim Poon PAY MoRE 95, 100 (1967).
14. "By establishing a reliable system of security, the legal system enables sellers and
lenders to extend credit in cases where business risks may dictate otherwise. While never a
substitute for sound evaluation practices, the fact of security tends to expand rather than
limit the extension of credit." Speldel, Enforcing Security Interests in Consumer Goods:
Some Notes on the Vicious Cycle, 7 U. RicH. L. Rnv. 187, 192 (1972).
15. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was drafted by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. The final draft, approved by the Commission and the
American Bar Association in 1968, has been enacted in the following states: Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. 1 CCH CoNsUMR Camrr Gum 4770
(1974). See generally Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition,
43 TEMP. L.Q. 313 (1970).
16. UNIFoRM CONSUMER CRarr Con §§ 2A07, 5.103. These slight modifications, which
primarily limit cross-collateral security interests of sellers and provide minimum monetary
balances needed for repossession, are discussed in Curran & Fand, AnAnalysis of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 49 NEB. L. Rnv. 727, 740 (1970).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970).
19. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.204 (First Final Draft, 1970) prohibited self-help or non-
judicial repossession and required the filing of a complaint and a preseizure hearing. Section
1974]
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repossession procedures in consumer protection legislation indicates
that these commercial devices serve a vital function in the consumer
credit market for both consumer and creditor.
Prejudgment Remedies and Due Process
The first major threat to prejudgment summary remedies came
in 1969 when, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,20 the Supreme
Court declared that prejudgment wage garnishment contravened
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if it permitted
withholding wages prior to notice and an opportunity for the defen-
dant to be heard.2' For the first time, the Court restricted a prejudg-
ment summary remedy by applying due process principles to
debtor-creditor relationships.
The scope of Sniadach was limited in two significant ways, how-
ever. First, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, acknowledged
that "[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements
of due process in extraordinary situations,"12 hinting that situations
requiring "special protection to a state or creditor interest" would
be sufficiently "extraordinary." ' Second, he emphasized the dis-
tinctive nature of wages as opposed to other forms of personal prop-
erty, pointing out that the deprivation of wages can "drive a wage-
earning family to the wall."
Although it appeared that the Sniadach principles might be lim-
ited strictly to situations involving prejudgment deprivation of
wages, the holding generated much speculation concerning the va-
lidity of other summary creditor remedies.25 This potential for limit-
5.112 of a subsequent draft, however, proposed in December1970, expressly allowed reposses-
sion without judicial process if it could be done without breach of the peace or entrance into
a dwelling. Speidel, supra note 14, at 198 & n.35.
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See generally Brown, A Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard, 46
ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 25 (1971); Countryman, supra note 6; Kennedy, Due Process Limitations
on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM.
U.L. REV. 158 (1970); Note, Summary Creditor Remedies: Going. . . Going. . . Gone?, 10
SAN DIaao L. REv. 292 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Summary Creditor Remedies].
21. 395 U.S. at 342.
22. Id. at 339.
23. Id. The Court also implied that garnishment to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction would
not be impaired by Sniadach principles. Id.
24. Id. at 341-42.
25. The case was described as a "silent revolution" by one commentator, Brown, supra note
20, at 26, and as the "constitutional explosion of 1969" by two others, Clark & Landers,
Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355
(1973).
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ing other summary remedies was indicated further in 1972 when the
Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin,21 reviewed the constitution-
ality of Florida" and Pennsylvania 2 statutes which permitted sum-
mary seizure of chattels without prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard.2s Both statutes were held unconstitutional on their face as
violative of the fourteenth amendment by applying Sniadach due
process principles to replevin procedures."
For two years Fuentes made questionable the validity of most
state replevin statutes by its declarations that even a temporary
deprivation of property must be preceded by notice and an oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing" and that the fourteenth amendment pro-
tects "any significant property interest, 32 including a mere posses-
sory interest. The Court reiterated that the requirements of due
process may be excused only in "extraordinary situations.
33
By upholding a Louisiana sequestration statute in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co.,3 1 however, the Supreme Court retreated from its
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.13 (Supp. 1972-73).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967).
29. The Florida appellant and three of the Pennsylvania appellants had purchased house-
hold goods under conditional sales contracts; in each case the sellers thereafter obtained writs
of replevin, claiming that installment payments were delinquent. The fourth Pennsylvania
appellant had been in a dispute with her former husband, a local deputy sheriff, over custody
of their son; a writ had been issued, upon application of the father, to seize the boy's furniture,
toys, and clothing. 407 U.S. at 70-72.
The Florida statute made replevin available to recover goods "wrongfully detained by any
other person," upon filing a complaint, which alleged wrongful detention in a conclusory
fashion, along with a bond for double the chattel's value. The Pennsylvania procedure was
similar, but required the applicant merely to submit his request with an affidavit stating the
value of the property to be replevied. In both states the writ could be issued by a clerk without
prior hearing or judicial scrutiny of the application. Upon issuance of the writ, in both states
the sheriff was directed to seize the goods and hold them for three days before delivering them
to the applicant, during which time the defendant could recover the goods by posting his own
bond. In Florida, the plaintiff was required to institute a suit for repossession which would
determine the merits of his claim; in Pennsylvania, the defendant had to initiate suit himself
if he disputed the merits of the claim. Id. at 73-78.
30. Id. at 96.
31. Id. at 84.85.
32. Id. at 86, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
33. Id. at 90. See notes 22-23 supra & accompanying text.
34. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). The Louisiana sequestration statute upheld in Mitchell was quite
similar to the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes struck down in Fuentes. See note
29 supra. The saving differences in the Louisiana statute, for the Mitchell Court, were (1)
limited grounds for issuance of the writ, (2) a requirement of specific, factual allegations in
the application, (3) consideration of the application by a judge rather than a clerk, and (4) .
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sweeping statements in Fuentes. Justice White, speaking for the
majority, was "... convinced that Fuentes was decided against a
factual and legal background sufficiently different from that [in
Mitchell]," to allow the Louisiana statute to be upheld without
overruling Fuentes;5 Fuentes did "not require the invalidation of
the Louisiana sequestration statute, either on its face or as applied
"36
opportunity for an immediate hearing on the merits after issuance and execution of the writ.
Id. at 1899-1905.
The Mitchell Court pointed out that "[i]n Florida and Pennsylvania property was only
to be replevied . . . if it had been 'wrongfully detained.' This broad 'fault' standard is
inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input. .... In Louisiana, on the
other hand, the facts relevant to obtaining a writ of sequestration are narrowly confined. As
we have indicated, documentary proof is particularly suited for questions of the existence of
a vendor's lien and the issue of default." Id. at 1905.
Articles 3571 and 3501 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provided the foundation
for issuance of the writ of sequestration. The former stated the grounds for sequestration, and
the latter provided that the writ was available only when specific facts supporting the grounds
asserted were presented in a verified petition or affidavit. Id. at 1899. In contrast to the
Florida and Pennsylvania procedures, "[t]he writ . . . will not issue on the conclusionary
allegation of ownership or possessory rights." Id.
In both Florida and Pennsylvania the writ was issued by a clerk who reviewed the applica-
tion to see that it was in proper form but did not evaluate the merits of the claim made
therein. In Louisiana, on the other hand, "the clear showing required must be made to a
judge, and the writ will issue only upon his authorization." Id.
Finally, in the Fuentes statutes a hearing on the merits was not immediately available to
the defendant-buyer, who "would 'eventually' have an opportunity for a hearing" in Florida,
but who would not be assured even of this in Pennsylvania unless he himself instituted an
action. Id. at 190.4. In contrast, "Louisiana law expressly provide[d] for an immediate
hearing and dissolution of the writ 'unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the
writ was issued.'" Id. at 1905.
The distinctions relied upon in Mitchell may not be as clear as they appeared to the Court,
especially as guidelines for drafting constitutional possessory action statutes. Justice Stewart,
in dissent, viewed the Mitchell facts as "constitutionally indistinguishable" from Fuentes,
suggesting that the Court had ". . . simply rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted
instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent." Id. at 1913.
WVhile this uncertainty eventually may be eliminated by the Court, the current status of
the law should not lead to forbearance in the legislative search for an accommodation of the
conflicting interests in the credit market. Indeed, the irresolute concept of consumer due
process was noted by the Mitchell Court in a discussion of recent proposals for consumer
credit reform: "We indicate no view whatsoever on the desirability of one or more of the
proposed reforms. The uncertainty evident in the current debate suggests caution in the
adoption of an inflexible constitutional rule." Id. at 1906 n.13. By citing the incertitude with
which potential solutions are being sought, Justice White seemed to beckon novel approaches
to the problem, as did Justice Stewart for the Fuentes majority. See note 2 supra & accompa-
nying text.
35. 94 S. Ct. at 1904. See note 34 supra.
36. 94 S. Ct. at 1904.
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The extent to which Mitchell limits the application of Fuentes
has yet to be determined. In Fuentes the Court declared: "[T]he
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires an ad-
versary hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived
of any possessory interest in tangible personal property, however
brief the dispossession and however slight his monetary interest
. . ."- As Justice Powell observed, the Court in Mitchell with-
drew "significantly from the full reach of that principle . ...,31
Exceptions no longer are limited to "extraordinary situations,"39 for
Mitchell suggests: "[1]t comports with duie process to permit initial
seizure on sworn ex parte documents, followed by the early oppor-
tunity to put the creditor to his proof,"4 as long as the possessory
writ is issued on "ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend them-
selves to documentary proof .... 2141
Because Mitchell indicates that prejudgment replevin will not be
invalidated solely because it may not provide notice or an opportun-
ity to be heard prior to deprivation of possession, legislatures are
free to retain summary repossession procedures which operate with-
out prior notice or hearing so long as each such procedure "...
37. Id. at 1908 (concurring opinion of Justice Powell describing the Fuentes decision).
38. Id. But see North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 715 (1975).
39. See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1901.
41. Id. The Court expressed concern for the creditor's risk involved in delaying seizure to
allow time for notice and hearing. Id. at 1900.01. A major factor in weighing this risk in
Mitchell was that ". . . under Louisiana law, the seller's vendor's lien expires if the buyer
transfers possession." Id. at 1901.
This unique characteristic of Louisiana property law places a great burden on a seller of
movable goods:
The Louisiana vendor's privilege is distinctly parallel to the purchase money
security interest in consumer goods . . . .[However,] [t]he Louisiana ven-
dor's reliance on this privilege will be more restricted than a purchase money
financer's dependence on the [unrecorded] Hen under the UCC since the exist-
ence of the privilege depends on possession of the object remaining in the pur-
chaser. The privilege has been held lost where the purchaser sells the object to
a third party who knows of the privilege, unless the third party assumes pay-
ment of the original debt. Even if the purchaser gratuitously transfers the goods
to a third party, the privilege will be lost.
Comment, Security Rights in Movables Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Louisiana
Law-A Transactional Comparison, 40 TuL. L. Rv. 747, 776 (1966).
Although an alternative recorded lien is available under the Louisiana Chattel Mortgage
Act, LA. RHv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:5351-64 (Supp. 1974), the unrecorded privilege was the type of
lien at issue in Mitchell. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 3217, 3227 (West 1952). For a discussion
of the vendor's Hen in Louisiana and a comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code, see
Comment, supra.
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protects the debtor's interest in every conceivable way, except al-
lowing him to have the property to start with . .."" Nevertheless,
the debtor's interest can be protected most fully only by allowing
him a voice in the proceeding that may deprive him of possession
of his property. Fuentes and Mitchell illustrate the difficulty of
balancing the interests of creditor and debtor in seeking a fair reso-
lution of disputes over possession of property in which each has an
interest. Acknowledging the extensive effects in the consumer credit
market of any modification of creditor remedies not only accen-
tuates this quandary, it also indicates that arbitration may provide
maximum protection to the interests of both creditors and debtors.
Economic Factors in Prejudgment Remedies
A delicate balance between consumer protection devices and
effective creditor remedies characterizes the consumer credit mar-
ket.413 In its final report, the National Commission on Consumer
Finance" confirmed the existence of this balance:
Early in the Commission's research program it became apparent
that creditors' remedies and collection practices had a direct,
personal impact on consumers and on the price and amount of
credit available. fliegal and unconscionable collection practices
42. 94 S. Ct. at 1905. Mitchell suggests that the criteria for a constitutionally valid sum-
mary repossession procedure will include: (1) mandatory minimal time between deprivation
of possession and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard, (2) sworn pleadings on
statutorily limited, explicit, and easily documented grounds prior to issuance of the reposses-
sion order or writ, and (3) procedures, such as bonding, "to put the property in the possession
of the party who furnishes protection against loss or damage to the other pending trial on
the merits." Id. at 1904-05.
43. See Patton, supra note 2, at 766 ("The elimination of creditors' prejudgment remedies
is not an absolute corollary to the vindication of debtors' prejudgment rights. The goal should
be to balance the legitimate, but competing, interests of debtors and creditors-not to over-
compensate for the inequities that may have existed in the pre-Sniadach era."); White, supra
note 8, at 511 ('It is time that the Court ceased due process balancing simply by assigning
appropriately pejorative labels to the losers and instead engaged in a serious attempt to
measure the costs and the benefits."); Comment, Replevin: A Due Process Prescription For
An Ancient Writ, 45 TmP..L.Q.. 259, 266 (1972) ("There is a dearth of evidence reflecting
the cost relationship between credit and remedy.").
44. The National Commission on Consumer Finance was established by Title IV of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. IV, §§ 401-07, 82 Stat. 164.
The purpose of the Commission was to study and appraise the functioning and structure of
the consumer finance industry and consumer credit transactions generally. The Commission's
findings and recommendations are contained in its final report. NATIoNAL CommissioN, supra
note 12.
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are instruments of economic and social oppression. However, a
dearth of legitimate collection tools results in higher costs, lead-
ing to higher rates and reduced availability at the margin. 5
There is little doubt that providing preseizure notice and hearing
to debtors under existing court procedures would increase the collec-
tion costs of secured creditors. Except when self-help could be em-
ployed, secured creditors would incur the expenses of employing an
attorney and process server for the preseizure hearing, providing
witnesses, and appearing in court." Delay in the seizure process
necessitated by giving meaningful notice may result in damage to
or deterioration of collateral, and the lack of summary repossession
might enable debtors to abscond with collateral upon receiving no-
tice of the preseizure hearing. 7 The secured creditor's alternative to
incurring the expense of preseizure notice and hearing would be to
forgo completely his right of repossession, depending entirely on
postjudgment remedies." This course of action, however, probably
45. NATIONAL COrMnSSION, supra note 12, at 1.
46. One commentator described the costs of collection resulting from the application of due
process rights to New York replevin procedures:
To comply with the due process requirements, the creditor may well find
himself: (1) going to court to obtain an order to show cause directing the debtor
to appear and be heard if he wishes; (2) arranging for satisfactory service within
defined and sometimes rigid time limits; (3) appearing on the return date with
counsel and witnesses, prepared to give testimony in case the debtor appears
and objects; (4) having obtained an order on the return date, arranging for
seizure by the sheriff or marshall; (5) making subsequent application for a
further order authorizing the Sheriff to force entry if delivery was originally
denied (perhaps through another order to show cause and followup return date,
if the local court deems this a necessary requirement either of discretion or due
process); and (6) adjusting to the information subsequently received that entry
had been forced, the goods were not found, or, if found, were in a depreciated
or valueless state. The creditor will also have incurred the cost of purchasing
the undertaking required by statute, apparently at the time of the original
application before it is even known whether the ultimate order of seizure will
be granted.
. T. he certain result is a substantial increase in cost, either through in-
creased legal expenses, decreased recoveries or both.
Gardner, Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditor and Replevin, 22 BuFF. L. Rav. 17, 28.
29 (1972). See also White, supra note 8, at 512.
47. Note, Constitutional Law-State Statutes Authorizing Summary Prejudgment Re-
plevin Orders Held Violative of Constitutional Due Process Requirements, 41 FoRDHrM L.
Rav. 1051, 1059-60 (1973); See Summary Creditor Remedies, supra note 20, at 309.
48. Frequent use of this alternative is unlikely. The National Commission on Consumer
Finance found that creditors rely heavily on repossession and that "no contract provision
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would result in fewer collection recoveries, thereby also increasing
the creditor's cost of doing business.
Elimination of summary repossession 9 may result in at least one
of four general economic effects: no appreciable effect on the con-
sumer credit market, additional collection costs passed on to con-
sumers in the form of higher interest rates or higher prices, an in-
crease in the minimum downpaymnent required by creditors, or
greater selectivity by creditors in granting credit thereby reducing
the availability of consumer credit.
One empirical study, which predicted minimal burdens of prior
notice and hearing requirements on the credit market, included
personal interviews with representatives of five banks, ten finance
companies, and six retail merchants randomly selected in Lubbock,
Texas.-5 Because of their infrequent use of the repossession remedy,
the creditor representatives presaged no effect on their credit poli-
cies. Banks indicated greater concern than either finance companies
or retailers, but still foresaw minimal effect.51 Several obvious limi-
tations tainted this study, including the small number'of interviews,
a limited geographic area, highly subjective responses, and creditor
representatives from a primarily agricultural economy.12 Although
gives the creditor more effective protection than security interest and its companion remedy,
the right to repossess upon 'default.'" NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 27.
49. Despite the Fuentes-inspired movement to restrict summary repossession procedures,
several observers have sought to discourage any changes in the consumer credit market
without prior empirical evidence to substantiate the proposed modification. "Once [the
existing legal framework] is upset, it is not readily put in balance. There is no justification
for tampering with our present structure of law until there is adequte consideration of the
possible consequences." Kripke, Collection Spite, An End to Academic Overreaction, And
the Next Curricular Step, 33 U. Prrr. L. R v. 681, 684 (1972). See also Dunham, Empiricism,
Law Reform and Consumer Protection, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 153 (1970); King, The Search For
Consumer Justice, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 151 (1970). Although such hesitancy was perhaps an
unarticulated premise of the Mitchell ruling, it should not lead to reluctance to experiment
with new techniques, such as arbitration, as a means of balancing conflicting interests in the
credit market.
50. Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, supra note 2, at 54-62.
51. An analysis of these overall results indicates that there is no need for the
credit market to be unduly concerned with the possible effects of Fuentes ....
Default occurs in only a small percentage of total loans made. Creditors stated
that in many of these defaults repossession as a collection remedy is not feasible
and in those few defaults where repossession is feasible, the vast majority of
debtors will voluntarily give up the collateral. This greatly diminishes the num-
ber of defaults where involuntary repossession is an important collection rem-
edy.
Id. at 62.
52. These limitations were acknowledged by the authors. Yd. at 56.
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the conclusions reached may have little, if any, application to the
national consumer credit market, the Texas study indicates that
one cannot ignore entirely the seemingly unlikely possibility that
elimination of summary repossession would have no effect on the
credit market.
Nevertheless, an increase in the cost of purchasing goods on credit
seems a more logical possibility. Inasmuch as a seller of goods or
services who suffers an increase in the cost of doing business usually
passes the increase on to the consumer in the form of higher prices,
creditors faced with increased collection costs presumably will raise
the price of credit.- Although existing state usury laws might curtail
increases in interest rates, 4 restrictions on prejudgment remedies
could lead to pressure for increased rate ceilings with increased
collection costs providing the justification. Even without amend-
ment of present usury laws, retail merchants could pass on their
additional costs in the form of higher prices on consumer goods. 5
Rather than raise the price of consumer goods, the retail mer-
chant may choose to guard himself from loss due to increased collec-
tion costs by requiring larger downpayments. Professor James
White noted that the probability of default on a consumer loan,
"even by the poorest credit risks," decreases as the size of the down-
payment increases." Demands for higher minimum downpayments
necessarily will result in denial of credit to consumers unable to
meet such demands since there is little, if any, difference to the
marginal consumer between an increased downpayment require-
ment and an outright denial of credit.7 Moreover, reduced credit
availability may result even without increased downpayments, be-
cause increased collection costs may motivate credit grantors to be
more selective in extending credit. Even without conscious selectiv-
53. See White, supra note 8, at 512; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-DueProcess-TheFuentes
Case: Sniadach Made Clear, 22 DEPAuL L. Ra,. 499, 509 (1972).
54. NAToNAL ComassioN, supra note 12, at 91-108.
55. Senator John Sparkman, a member of the National Commission on Consumer Finance,
recognized that restrictions on creditors' remedies could cause increases in the price of goods.
'I have always supported recommendations and legislation designed to benefit the consumer
if in doing so we could strike a delicate balance so that the consumer is, in fact, protected
without... driving up the cost of consumer goods and items as well as credit." Id. at 219
(separate statement).
56. White, supra note 8, at 522.
57. As used herein, "marginal consumers" refers to those consumers who present the high-
est probability of default, but who nonetheless would be granted at least some credit prior to
the modification of existing creditor remedies. Typically, the marginal consumer earns a low
income and depends on credit to purchase durable household goods and other necessities.
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ity, increased interest rates or sales prices effectively may reduce
credit availability by indirectly excluding marginal consumers from
the credit market. 8
It has been suggested that a reduction in consumer credit availa-
bility may be beneficial socially because it would eliminate overex-
tension of credit to those who are likely to default." Professor Homer
Kripke has isolated the basic error in this approach: "([It assumes
that default represents fault on the part of the creditor in the exten-
sion of credit."6 Many sociological factors determine whether a debt
will be paid;6' to determine the overall desirability of reduced credit
58. See White, supra note 8, at 512; Williams, Creditors'Prejudgment Remedies: Expand-
ing Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 60 (1972); Summary Creditor
Remedies, supra note 20, at 306-09; Comment, Replevin: A Due Process Prescription For An
Ancient Writ, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 259, 265 (1972).
The National Commission on Consumer Finance concluded that there is "little doubt" that
the availability of credit would be "severely curtailed if the right to a security interest and
to repossess were restricted." NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 30.
A study by the Yale Law Journal shows the effect of legislation which eliminated the
holder-in-due-course doctrine. Comment, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legisla-
tion: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
Discussing the results of this study, Allison Dunham emphasized a significant decline in the
number of contractors, retailers, and builders supplying home improvement services to con-
sumers. The Yale study showed that both quality and shoddy suppliers were forced out of
business because they were unable to extend credit to consumers profitably, illustrating the
correlation between restrictions on creditors remedies and the availability of credit. Dunham,
Empiricism, Law Reform and Consumer Protection, 23 J. LEGAL Et. 153, 156-57 (1970).
Restrictions on prejudgment replevin seemingly would have a similar effect.
The National Commission on Consumer Finance concurred:
Restrictions on creditors' remedies make the creditors' position less favorable
than if they had full use of all legal collection tools. In the face of limitations
on remedies a creditor can either (1) increase rates to cover added collection
[costs] and bad debt losses or (2) maintain the same rates but exercise more
selectivity in granting credit. To the extent that borrowers are sensitive to rates
charged for credit, the first option will find less demand for credit at the higher
price. The second will result in fewer qualified borrowers. Both will result in
reduced availability.
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 114.
59. See Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process and Louisiana
Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV. 62,80 (1972); Note, State Action and WaiverImplications
of Self-Help Repossession, 25 ME. L. REV. 27,42 (1973). While expressing no personal opinion
on its merits, Judge Robert Braucher characterized this subsidiary issue in consumer protec-
tion advances as determining "how many low-income consumers should be excluded from the
credit market." Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43
TEMP. L.Q. 313, 327 (1970).
60. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1, 29
(1969).
61. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 43 (Exhibit 3-1).
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availability, these factors must be considered along with an appre-
ciation for the importance of providing credit to marginal
consumers . 2 Additionally, denial of credit to low-income consumers
may lead to increased discontent in poverty areas or to increased
theft, or it may cause marginal consumers to patronize illegal credit
grantors. Illegal lenders undoubtedly will accommodate consumers
excluded from the legal credit market, and certainly the collection
practices of these lenders do not conform to due process require-
ments.1
3
The dangers of higher interest rates, higher prices of goods, higher
downpayment requirements, and less availability of credit resulting
from increased costs of collection make simple abolition of summary
prejudgment remedies of questionable benefit. The appearance of
Fuentes and Mitchell within the space of two years illustrates the
difficulties in balancing debtor and creditor interests in consumer
disputes. It is time for consumer advocates and legislators to con-
sider seriously an alternative to present procedures which will main-
tain the speed and economy of summary creditor remedies while
providing the fairness of notice and an opportunity to be heard to
the consumer. Such an alternative can be found in arbitration.
CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Arbitration is "[tihe submission for determination of disputed
matter to private unofficial persons selected in manner provided by
law or agreement." 4 Although usually voluntary and dependent
upon a contractual provision regarding future disputes, it also may
be compelled by statutes."5 Unlike mediation, arbitration results in
62. Kripke noted: "[W]e cannot adopt restrictions on remedies so punitive as to put the
credit sellers in the poverty areas, and their financiers, out of business. Despite the present
high social cost, they serve a social purpose. The demand for modem appliances and other
amenities, and for such necessities as color television and stereo sets, is irresistible at all levels
of poverty, including that of welfare clients." Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. Rlv. 445, 479 (1968).
The National Commission on Consumer Finance recognized the important policy consider-
ations involved in a denial of credit to marginal consumers, but took no affirmative position.
"Unfortunately, the Commission has been able to devise no empirical method for determining
who should get credit, how much credit, what kind of credit, and at what price." NATIoNAL
ComhAssIoN, supra note 12, at 2.
63. See Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional
Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 60, 111 (1972).
64. BUcK's LAw DiaoNmRY 134 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
65. Note, An Analysis of A Technique of Dispute Settlement: The Expanding Role of
Arbitration, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. RaV. 618, 619 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dispute Settlement].
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a binding decision rendered by the unofficial tribunal, thus provid-
ing a substitute for litigation.
As one of the oldest methods of dispute settlement, arbitration
. . no doubt pre-dates our traditional judicial system and, in
some respects, is the philosophical and procedural father of civil
litigation";68 references to its use can be found in mythology, fable,
and even Biblical verse. 7 It has played a major role in the field of
labor-mangement relations since the early part of the twentieth
century, especially since World War H. It has played a lesser role
in commercial dispute settlement, but this use also has increased
since the 1940's.
The first modem arbitration statute, enacted in New York in
1920,18 subsequently was copied by most state legislatures. These
statutes make arbitration agreements enforceable, confer certain
powers upon arbitrators, and limit the scope of judicial review of
arbitration awards. " A comparable federal statute also has been
enacted, governing circumstances where the parties otherwise would
have access to federal diversity jurisdiction."
The attractiveness of arbitration as a means of resolving disputes
outside the courtroom has increased in recent years. While on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Chief Justice
Warren Burger advocated its expanded use: "[Tjhere are better
ways of resolving private disputes, and we must in the public inter-
est move toward taking a large volume of private conflicts out of the
courts and into the channels of arbitration." 71
A properly designed debtor-creditor arbitration system could
allow quick, low-cost settlement of consumer credit disputes while
giving the debtor an opportunity to appear and be heard. To be
effective such a system must be mandatory, limited in scope, and
characterized by relaxed evidentiary and procedural rules. Careful
attention to minimizing costs, time, and complexity in developing
66. Lippman, Arbitration As An Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected
Perspectives, 24 ME. L. Ray. 215, 215-16 (1972).
67. Dispute Settlement, supra note 65, at 618.
68. The New York arbitration provisions are now contained in N.Y. Cv. PRAC. LAW §§
7501-14 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
69. Lippman, supra note 66, at 216.
70. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
71. Address by Warren Burger, Meeting of the American Arbitration Association, Novem-
ber 1968, in Lippman, supra note 66, at 215 n.1.
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consumer arbitration can produce an appropriate forum for fair and
speedy settlement of consumer disputes.
Arbitration hearings should be limited in scope.
In order to provide a speedy and inexpensive procedure for obtain-
ing a writ of replevin, the arbitration statute should limit the scope
of mandatory arbitration solely to the question of whether a writ
should issue, focusing on whether there is a clear showing that the
plaintiff-creditor is likely to prevail at a trial on the merits." The
debtor should be given an opportunity to rebut the creditor's evi-
dence and interpose affirmative defenses, and the arbitrator should
award or withhold the writ on the basis of the probable outcome at
trial. If the writ is not granted, the plaintiff should have the right
to proceed to seek judgment on the merits in court; if the writ is
granted, the plaintiff still should be required to proceed to judgment
within a specified time period, thus ensuring that the debtor will be
afforded a full trial on the merits.73
By limiting the scope of mandatory arbitration to the issue of
whether a writ should be granted, the creditor will be relieved of the
expensive and time-consuming burden of presenting all of his wit-
nesses and evidence. In the usual case, the creditor only will need
to present an employee to testify from business records regarding
the validity of the consumer credit transaction, the default, and
absence of known defenses.74
Although the scope of the mandatory hearing should be limited,
the parties should have the right to submit the entire dispute to
arbitration voluntarily. The arbitrator must exercise the utmost
discretion, however, in encouraging submission of the dispute to
himself for final adjudication. He should advise the parties of this
alternative at the beginning of the hearing, while emphasizing that
72. This "clear showing" would seem consonant with due process as discussed in Mitchell,
while providing the notice and hearing required byFuentes. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
94 S. Ct. 1895, 1899, 1905 (1974).
73. Opportunity for early hearing on the merits would seem to be required by Mitchell,
even though the procedure contemplated here is not exparte. The Louisiana statute's require-
ment of a subsequent full hearing on the merits was one of the factors the Court cited in
upholding the statute's constitutionality. Anything less than a full hearing after repossession
might fall short of the Mitchell due process standards. See id. at 1901, 1904-05. See also note
5 supra.
74. That the proof of these issues often may be accomplished by documentary evidence was
noted in Mitchell. 94 S. Ct. at 1901, 1905.
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the right remains to adjudicate the underlying issue in a court of law
and, where appropriate, before a jury. 5 Such warning, together with
explicit statutory language limiting the power of the consumer arbi-
tration system, is necessary to avoid consumer confusion; every ef-
fort should be made to keep the debtor from mistaking the writ of
replevin for a binding judgment.
Compulsory arbitration of prejudgment replevin requests should
be limited to consumer credit transactions. It is essential that credit
be available for the purchase of consumer goods, especially house-
hold items, the deprivation of which may cause extreme hardship.
Collection costs therefore must be minimized if credit availability
is to be maintained; limiting the mandatory arbitration proceeding
to the comparatively simple issues of consumer credit will avoid the
expense of maintaining a system capable of resolving complex busi-
ness disputes. Simultaneously, arbitration can prevent temporary
deprivation that does not satisfy the due process standards estab-
lished in Fuentes and Mitchell, while possibly avoiding the neces-
sity of obtaining expensive legal services in defense of a judicial
proceeding. The delicate balance in the consumer credit market
thus can be preserved by disregarding policy considerations that
may be present in other unrelated areas. 78
Arbitration should be mandatory for creditors seeking repossession
of goods.
A successful debtor-creditor arbitration system should be manda-
tory to avert the otherwise probable avoidance of its use. The need
for such compulsion was illustrated in an experiment by the Na-
tional Center for Dispute Settlement (NCDS), an organization es-
tablished by the American Arbitration Association to extend arbi-
tration techniques into areas of community dispute other than the
traditional commercial and labor relations conflicts. An attempt by
75. This aspect of the arbitration procedure should be watched closely by legislators and
judicial administrators for the purpose of detecting abuses by arbitrators or creditors. If
undue pressures are exerted on consumers to forgo their right to a plenary trial, legislative
modification should be considered.
76. A supplementary benefit of arbitration is that it avoids placing additional stress on
already overcrowded court calendars. The use of a procedure similar to that approved in
Mitchell would not share this advantage, and, in fact, might aggravate the problem, since
the postseizure hearing arguably must be "immediate" to satisfy due process requirements.
94 S. Ct. at 1899, 1901, 1905. This immediacy requirement would give priority status to
replevin hearings, necessitating further delays for other civil and criminal matters.
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NCDS to arbitrate consumer disputes was a complete failure, how-
ever, primarily because of an inability to bring conflicts suitable for
arbitration into the system; store managers would not agree in ad-
vance to bring disputes to the Center, and staff and budget limita-
tions prevented effectively advertising the service directly to con-
sumers. 77
Other attempts to implement voluntary arbitration of consumer
grievances have been made in recent years, the most comprehensive
being that established by the Council of Better Business Bureaus.
Although more than 70 of the Council's bureaus are implementing
or planning arbitration programs, the existing projects are not suc-
ceeding. The unwillingness of businessmen to participate in the
projects appears to be the major factor in this failure.78 Reasons for
this reluctance may include mistrust of an unfamiliar procedure,
misunderstanding of its benefits, and fear that an arbitrator may
either sympathize unduly with consumers or disregard legal rules.79
Therefore, experience has shown that, if arbitration is to protect
both debtors' and creditors' rights to the fullest possible extent, it
should be a mandatory initial step to prejudgment repossession.
Several jurisdictions have enacted legislation providing for com-
pulsory arbitration of certain disputes." Although constitutional
attacks, primarily based on denial of the right to trial by jury in civil
cases, have been made on these statutes,8' they should not be vul-
nerable if the procedure concerns only prejudgment possession,
since the parties still could be compelled to adjudicate the underly-
ing cause of action in the courts. Even if power is granted to the
consumer arbitration system to decide the underlying issue, consti-
tutional attacks may be averted by providing for a trial de novo of
the underlying issue in the court on petition by either party 2
77. McGonagle, Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, 27 ARB. J. 65, 72-75 (1972). The prob-
lem of advertising directly to consumers was intensified by the need to screen complaints for
appropriateness for arbitration and to conduct negotiations to obtain the parties' consent to
arbitration. No consumer disputes were ever brought to the Center, and the experiment was
abandoned. Id.
78. Dispute Settlement, supra note 65, at 639.
79. See NATIONAL INms'rtrrn FOR CONSUMER JUSrI cE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRmvANcEs 7-8
(1973).
80. Lippman, supra note 66, at 238.
81. See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 432, 440 (1957).
82. See id. at 441. Where compulsory arbitration is designed to substitute for a trial on the
merits, courts have upheld existing compulsory .arbitration statutes if the right to an appeal
or a trial de novo is provided. See, e.g., In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal
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Rules of evidence and procedural requirements should be relaxed.
A consumer arbitration statute should provide for relaxed rules of
evidence to minimize the complexity, time, and expense of prejudg-
ment replevin hearings. For example, the admissibility of hearsay
evidence should be within the sole discretion of the arbitrator; nar-
rative testimony unhampered by technical objections should be en-
couraged; and the best evidence rule should not be operative. 3 Be-
cause rules of evidence are important primarily when a lay jury is
the trier of factss their relaxation should not reduce the arbitrator's
ability to determine the probability of plaintiff's success on the
merits of the case.
Procedural requirements and formalities also should be mini-
mized. The arbitration statute should recommend brief, simple ex-
ample forms for petitions for writs of replevin. Written responses to
petitions should be optional, while preserving the defendant's right
to respond orally at the hearing itself.
Costs of the arbitration proceeding should be met by the unsuccess-
ful party.
Cost minimization is a vital prerequisite to the preservation of
quick and adequate summary remedies that guarantee the debtor
an opportunity to be heard. Several methods may be used to obtain
this objective. Eliminating written opinions and cumbersome pa-
perwork can reduce the cost of the proceeding considerably; relaxed
service of process rules will produce similar results. Arbitration costs
therefore should be substantially lower than in comparable judicial
proceedings for replevin. It is certain, however, that some costs will
result, and the arbitrator should be given the power to assess costs
against the unsuccessful party, as long as the costs do not exceed a
specified maximum amount. If the unsuccessful party ultimately
prevails at the trial on the merits, the trial court should be empow-
ered to reverse the arbitrator's assessment. The possible burden of
dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). It is perhaps more desirable, however, to exclude trial of the
underlying issues from mandatory arbitration, allowing such issues to be decided at arbitra-
tion only on a voluntary basis. See notes 72-75 supra & accompanying text.
83. Only the rules of evidentiary privilege should be unalterable. The policies underlying
these rules, which are usually unrelated to probative value, outweigh the procedural benefits
to be gained by their elimination. See C. MCCoRMcK, LAW op EVmENC § 72 (1954).
84. Lippman, supra note 66, at 240 n.140.
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arbitration costs should not discourage either party from prosecu-
ting a meritorious case.
Lawyers should serve as arbitrators.
Successful arbitration of prejudgment replevin disputes will de-
pend greatly on the selection of competent arbitrators; lawyers fa-
miliar with consumer protection legislation, contract law, and perti-
nent constitutional safeguards are best qualified to serve in this
capacity. Arbitrators with this legal expertise also must be free from
bias, however. Attorneys devoted to the furtherance of consumer
protection may be too sympathetic to consumers, while attorneys
who frequently represent lending institutions, finance companies, or
retailers may be creditor-oriented. These attitudes might affect, or
appear to affect, the impartiality of the proceeding, potentially dis-
crediting the entire arbitration program.
Numerous selection methods have been used in consumer arbitra-
tion proceedings, the two most common being direct appointment
by an administrator from a list of competent arbitrators and selec-
tion from this list by the parties themselves." The former method
is preferable in replevin proceedings, since selection by the parties
undoubtedly would be advantageous to creditors, who would be
more likely to know the arbitrators from past experience. Consum-
ers, unfamiliar with an arbitrator's previous record, would be in-
clined to choose one at random. Random selection by an adminis-
trator would eliminate this advantage, while also avoiding the delay
which otherwise would be encountered while the parties agreed
upon an arbitrator.
Service of process should be by registered or certified mail.
Requiring personal service on consumers and a lengthy notice
period prior to hearing could increase collection costs considerably
in prejudgment replevin proceedings. Not only would creditors have
to pay for personal service, but the delay between notice and hearing
would increase the probability that debtors would either adscond
with the collateral or damage and abuse it. Since the creditor should
be required to commence a plenary action on the debt within a
85. See, e.g., NAIONAL CENTER FOR DisPur E SLnrx.mFNT, CONSUMER ARnrrRATION RULES §
7, May 15, 1971, as amended.
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specified time period after the writ of replevin is issued,86 and since
that action must be commenced by the service of a summons and
complaint, the service of notice of the arbitration hearing is not the
final notice to be given. Therefore, a more flexible method of service
is justified in the preseizure hearing. Notice by certified or regis-
tered mail would provide an inexpensive, speedy, and reliable
method, especially since the receipt can be submitted to the arbitra-
tor as proof of service. Furthermore, in view of widespread abuses
by professional process servers in low-income neighborhoods,87 serv-
ice by certified or registered mail may be even more reliable than
personal service. 8
Legislatures should attempt to provide for the shortest possible
notice period which still will comply with constitutional require-
ments." Creditors' fears that notice of any type may cause the
debtor to abscond with or destroy the property may be assuaged by
retaining present ex parte remedies for use in limited, extraordinary
situations. A showing of potential danger to the chattel if left in the
debtor's possession, even if only for the limited notice period under
the arbitration procedure, would justify avoiding the notice require-
ment."0
Advisory commissions should investigate and improve consumer
arbitration systems.
Since numerous arbitration techniques are available for adapta-
tion to consumer dispute resolution, legislatures should provide for
continual investigation and evaluation of new methods to make
86. See note 73 supra & accompanying text.
87. One observer has reported that abusive forms of personal service, often referred to as
"sewer service," result in thousands of default judgments. "These blatant violations of due
process are a major cause of 90 percent-plus rate in default judgments in parts of New York
City." B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUzMER CREDr CASES 115-16 (1972). See also
Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1, 37-38 (1969);
Note, Abuse of Process: SewerService, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. Pnoa. 17 (1967); Note, Consumer
Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 765 (1967).
88. The National Institute for Consumer Justice reported recently: "Service by certified
or registered mail is likely to be at least as efficient as the personal service methods currently
in use in our large cities." NATioNAL INsTrrTurE FoR CONSUMER Jusuca, REDREss OF CONSUMER
GRmvANcas 19 (1973).
89. A seven-day interval between notice and hearing has been suggested as sufficient to
satisfy due process requirements. Patton, supra note 2, at 755; Note, Procedural Due
Process-The Prior Hearing Rule and The Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 41,
68-69 (1973).
90. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
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arbitration more efficient, speedy, and inexpensive. Experimenta-
tion should be encouraged with national or regional conferences
among state officials to discuss the results of individual state efforts.
Economists should monitor the consumer credit market closely for
effectiveness, and constitutional lawyers should act as watchdogs to
ensure against the erosion of due process protections.
Study commissions should consider the desirability of discourag-
ing or prohibiting representation by counsel in arbitration proceed-
ings. Debate continues concerning whether representation by coun-
sel is desirable in small claims courts, consumer arbitration pro-
ceedings, and other nonjudicial dispute-settling processes."' If
deemed appropriate in the prejudgment replevin context, a means
should be devised to assure all consumers will be able to obtain legal
assistance. Because the matter of legal representation is sensitive
and complex, it should be investigated carefully to find a solution
which is in the best interest of all parties.
Appropriate times and places for holding arbitration hearings also
91. The importance of providing counsel to consumers in these situations was emphasized
by Professor Vern Countryman:
It is probably also true today that most debtors will default on any opportunity
the law gives them for a prior hearing before they are deprived of their property
or their liberty. But many of them would not if, when they received notice of
that opportunity, they had competent legal counsel to advise them as to whether
they were in default and whether they had any defenses based on the creditor's
default or the creditor's violation of the strictures of a growing body of legislation
designed for the protection of consumers.
Countryman, supra note 6, at 575. But see Lippman, supra note 66, at 239-40: "A hallmark
of arbitration is its informal procedure. This characteristic, particularly attractive in con-
sumer arbitration, makes it possible for the system to function without requiring attorneys."
The National Institute for Consumer Justice recommended that lawyers and law students
be prohibited from appearing before small claims courts except to represent themselves:
There are many reasons why lawyers should be kept out of the small claims
court. The typical individual plaintiff will not have a lawyer; he comes to small
claims court because his claim is not large enough to warrant hiring one. If the
other side appears with a lawyer, the individual litigantwillbe at a considerable
disadvantage. The presence of a lawyerin a proceeding may affect it in a variety
of obvious and subtle ways. It may cause the judge to take a less active role in
the trying of the case. The judge may be more hesitant to cross-examine and
slower to draw out the plaintiff. The lawyer will inevitably complicate the proce-
dure by the use of evidentiary objections, by making motions, and perhaps in
other ways. By these and other means he may effectively intimidate the individ-
ual plaintiff; he will surely put that plaintiff at a disadvantage.
NATIONAL INsTITurE FoR CoNsUmER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES 23 (1973). But
see id. at 48 (separate statement of Philip Elman, a director of the Institute, expressing
disagreement with the nstitute's position).
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should be investigated. Hearings held in the evening hours or on
weekends would reduce greatly the cost to the individual consumer
who may otherwise have to sacrifice a day of work to defend against
a repossessing creditor. Use of the arbitrator's business office in the
evenings or on weekends also would reduce administrative costs of
arbitration by utilizing office space already rented for other pur-
poses.9"
The desirability of requiring and publishing written opinions by
arbitrators, the proper scope of judicial review, if any, 3 and the
application of rigid rules of law94 also must be studied fully by state
commissions in order to devise arbitration systems which provide
maximum efficiency, speed, and justice while minimizing the costs
of prejudgment replevin procedures.
CONCLUSION
Comparison of the Fuentes and Mitchell opinions reveals the dif-
ficulty of providing an effective process for determining prejudg-
ment possessory rights to property securing consumer credit trans-
actions which meets fairness and constitutional due process require-
ments. Fuentes, focusing on the rights of the debtor, enunciated a
sweeping requirement of notice and hearing prior to deprivation of
possession; Mitchell, emphasizing the rights of the creditor, found
no denial of the debtor's due process rights in ex parte repossession
proceedings if accompanied by stringent procedural safeguards. A
consumer arbitration system can provide an answer for legislatures
seeking to balance the due process rights of debtors with the credi-
tors' need for adequate default remedies, while minimizing the ef-
fect of the form of dispute settlement on the credit market. Through
arbitration, the spirit and concerns of both Fuentes and Mitchell
can be met.
Extensive social research and economic analysis is essential for
intelligent legislative decisionmaking on changes in collection prac-
tices and creditors' remedies. Therefore, in addition to establishing
this inexpensive and speedy procedure for prejudgment replevin
hearings, legislatures should establish advisory commissions to con-
duct needed studies. These commissions should investigate the ef-
92. See McGonagle, supra note 77, at 77.
93. See generally Dispute Settlement, supra note 65, at 632-34.
94. See generally F. ErKwum & E. ELmoum, How 2AnrrRATION Woms 321-64 (3d ad. 1973).
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fects of decisions such as Fuentes and Mitchell as well as the opera-
tion of consumer arbitration to recommend refinement of the basic
arbitration concept.
The inherent ability of legislatures to experiment with novel ap-
proaches to pressing problems makes them the appropriate bodies
to develop a lasting solution to the prejudgment replevin dilemma.
Indeed, the vacillation of the Supreme Court compels this conclu-
sion. Consumer arbitration provides an opportunity to mold a rem-
edy for the present upheaval in the consumer credit market that
should not be neglected.
